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Extradition to Venezuela 🇻🇪

Last updated: June 2026

Arrest, arrest warrant or Red Notice connected to Venezuela? As a Certified Specialist in Criminal Law I defend nationwide against extradition — acting early is decisive for the outcome.

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Overview

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (República Bolivariana de Venezuela) has no bilateral extradition treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany. Venezuela is neither a contracting state of the European Convention on Extradition nor an EU member; the European Arrest Warrant does not apply. Extradition relations are therefore assessed exclusively on a treaty-less basis under Sections 1 ff. IRG and require a formal assurance of reciprocity from Venezuela (Section 5 IRG). Germany–Venezuela treaty relations are limited to areas such as investment protection and double taxation; no extradition or mutual legal assistance agreement exists.

Formal Venezuelan extradition requests to Germany are rare. In practice, the Venezuela connection becomes relevant above all through Interpol alerts (Red Notices and diffusions), through the risk of arrest when traveling in third or transit states, and through requests that put forward a criminal allegation but in fact target regime-critical, oppositional or journalistic activity. Added to this are ordinary criminal allegations (economic, corruption, drug and money-laundering offenses), where, however, the same structural concerns about the Venezuelan judiciary are at the forefront.

The defense in Venezuela constellations is shaped by the state of the rule of law: for years the judiciary has been regarded as lacking independence and dependent on the government, repression against the opposition is pursued systematically, and detention conditions are marked by reports of torture and dire prison conditions. Extradition therefore regularly appears inadmissible from the outset in politically tinged cases — the decisive grounds being persecution on political grounds (Section 6 IRG) and protection against torture and inhuman treatment (Section 73 sentence 1 IRG in conjunction with Article 3 ECHR).

Higher Regional Court — the competent OLG decides on the admissibility of an extradition
The competent Higher Regional Court decides on the admissibility of the extradition.

Legal basis

In the absence of an international agreement, the German Act on International Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (IRG) of 23 Dec 1982 applies directly. Treaty-less extradition requires an assurance of reciprocity under Section 5 IRG; under Section 3 IRG dual criminality is required (the offense punishable at its upper limit by imprisonment of more than one year, or, in the case of enforcement, at least four months of sentence remaining). Political, military and exclusively fiscal offenses are subject to Sections 6 and 7 IRG.

For German citizens, extradition to Venezuela is precluded under Article 16(2) of the Basic Law in conjunction with Section 80 IRG; the relaxation in Section 80 IRG applies only to extraditions to EU member states. This bar also applies to German–Venezuelan dual nationals (cf. BVerfGE 113, 273 — European Arrest Warrant I). Multiple nationality has been permissible without a retention permit since the Nationality Modernization Act of 27 June 2024. Conversely, Venezuela too in principle does not extradite its own nationals under Article 69 of its 1999 Constitution.

On the Venezuelan side, extradition is governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Orgánico Procesal Penal); both active and passive extradition requests are decided by the Criminal Cassation Chamber of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, TSJ). It is precisely this TSJ that lies at the center of the rule-of-law concerns: for years it has been regarded as staffed with government-aligned judges and as lacking independence. On the German side, the Higher Regional Courts (Oberlandesgericht, OLG) decide on admissibility (Sections 13 ff. IRG); the granting decision is made by the General Public Prosecutor's Offices, and in cases of fundamental or foreign-policy significance by the Federal Office of Justice (Bundesamt für Justiz, BfJ) in agreement with the Federal Foreign Office.

Country-specific issues in Venezuela

Death penalty — abolished at constitutional level: Venezuela has no death penalty. Article 43 of the 1999 Constitution declares the right to life inviolable and expressly prohibits providing for or imposing the death penalty by law. Historically, Venezuela was among the first states worldwide to abolish the death penalty for all offenses (as early as 1863). The bar to extradition under Section 8 IRG is therefore — unlike with many treaty-less states — typically not at the forefront. What is decisive instead of the death penalty are the objections concerning persecution and detention conditions.

A judiciary without independence — government-dependent courts: Human-rights organizations and the reporting of international observers document that the Venezuelan judiciary lost its independence at the latest following the reconstitution of the Supreme Court under President Chávez and that it supports the executive's course of repression against critics. The Public Prosecutor's Office, too, is described in this context as complicit in serious human-rights violations. Criminal proceedings in Venezuela therefore regularly offer no guarantee of a fair, rule-of-law-compliant procedure — a circumstance that must be factored into the review under Sections 6 and 73 IRG in every request.

Political crisis and repression after the July 2024 election: The presidential election of 28 July 2024 is internationally disputed. The government-aligned electoral authority (CNE) declared incumbent Nicolás Maduro the winner, while the opposition around María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, relying on published polling-station tally sheets, claimed a clear victory for González; numerous states did not recognize the official result. In the aftermath, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and a UN Fact-Finding Mission documented a wave of arrests (“Operación Tun Tun”), arbitrary detentions, deaths during protests as well as enforced disappearances. Allegations such as “incitement to hatred” or “terrorism” regularly serve to suppress the opposition, protesters and journalists. Such proceedings are a bar under Section 6(1) IRG (political offense) and Section 6(2) IRG (risk of persecution on account of political opinion or membership of a social group).

International investigations — ICC: The International Criminal Court (ICC) is conducting the investigation “Venezuela I” into the suspicion of crimes against humanity, in particular in the context of detention and repression since at least April 2017; the investigation was resumed in 2023 after the lower instance had denied any effective national reckoning. This international engagement underscores that diplomatic assurances by Venezuela cannot constitute a sound basis for an extradition.

Abuse of Interpol: Politically motivated alerts are impermissible under Article 3 of the Interpol Constitution, which prohibits any activity of a political, military, religious or racial character; they can be challenged before the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF). Where there is a Venezuela connection, an arrest at home or in a transit country must be averted early on through a CCF deletion request, a protective brief filed with the BKA and the Federal Office of Justice, and consular precautions.

Detention conditions and the human-rights review

Detention conditions in the Venezuelan prison system are documented by numerous independent sources (the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the US State Department as well as the Venezuelan prison observatory Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones) as seriously contrary to human rights. Reported are massive overcrowding (occupancy rates well above 180 %), the use of police cells as long-term places of detention, inadequate provision of water, food and medical care, as well as torture and ill-treatment: beatings, electric shocks, suffocation with plastic bags, sexualized violence and solitary confinement in dark, overcrowded punishment cells. Several facilities were for years effectively under the control of criminal gangs (for instance Tocorón, until it was cleared in 2023); notorious, moreover, are intelligence-service facilities such as El Helicoide.

Particularly grave is the practice of incommunicado detention: political prisoners — whose number human-rights organizations put at several hundred to over a thousand for the period after the 2024 election — are cut off from the outside world, lawyers and relatives for weeks and months; this isolation is itself assessed as a form of torture. Effective monitoring of treatment after a surrender would not be guaranteed under such conditions.

From German case law it follows: in an extradition to Venezuela, the standard of review developed for Article 3 ECHR / Article 4 of the EU Charter (Aranyosi/Căldăraru, ECJ C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU — to be applied as a standard even outside the European Arrest Warrant) regularly weighs decisively against admissibility. A mere diplomatic assurance of “humane treatment” does not suffice in view of the documented situation and the absence of a reliable monitoring mechanism. Consular assistance is provided through the German Embassy in Caracas on the basis of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 Apr 1963 (VCCR) — though, given the incommunicado practice, its practical value is limited in the most endangered constellations.

Lines of defense

The defense in Venezuela extradition proceedings is regularly promising where it is structured by counsel at an early stage. Review grid:

  • Section 6(2) IRG (risk of political persecution): Mandatory to examine where there is a connection to the opposition, the protest movement, human-rights work or journalism — regularly a bar. It also covers an ostensibly “criminal” request behind which lies a persecutory purpose (for instance “incitement to hatred”, “terrorism”).
  • Section 6(1) IRG (political offense): Relevant in the case of security- and state-protection-related offenses; given the documented instrumentalization of the judiciary, to be worked out early.
  • Section 73 sentence 1 IRG in conjunction with Article 3 ECHR (torture/detention conditions): Regularly the decisive argument. Systematically introduce into the admissibility proceedings the reports of the UN Fact-Finding Mission, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch on overcrowding, torture and incommunicado detention.
  • Section 73 sentence 1 IRG (fair trial / ordre public): The lack of independence of the TSJ and the Public Prosecutor's Office establishes that a rule-of-law-compliant procedure is not guaranteed — to be argued independently against extradition.
  • Article 16(2) of the Basic Law in conjunction with Section 80 IRG: Where there is German citizenship — including German–Venezuelan dual nationals — extradition is precluded.
  • Section 5 IRG (reciprocity): Treaty-less — a formal, sound assurance of reciprocity from Venezuela is required and must be critically reviewed.
  • Section 3 IRG (dual criminality): Politically tinged or vague Venezuelan offenses (for instance “incitement to hatred”) must be carefully reviewed against a German counterpart and as to their true character — a mirror-image and subsumption review.
  • Section 11 IRG (rule of specialty): To be separately secured in a treaty-less extradition; a concrete listing of the offenses granted, with supplementary requests only upon renewed consent.
  • Interpol/CCF: Challenge a politically motivated Red Notice or diffusion under Article 3 of the Interpol Constitution; an early CCF deletion request, a protective brief filed with the BKA and the Federal Office of Justice.
  • Constitutional complaint with an urgent application (Section 32 BVerfGG): After the OLG declares the extradition admissible, the standard remedy in the case of fundamental-rights violations (Article 1(1), Article 2(2), Article 25 of the Basic Law in conjunction with Article 3 ECHR); where the detention-conditions and persecution objections are carefully worked out, the prospects are not negligible.

Legal representation in Venezuelan extradition proceedings

An extradition case is a specialized mutual-legal-assistance procedure that goes beyond classic criminal defense. Engaging a defense lawyer specialized in extradition law at an early stage is regularly decisive — not only after the formal extradition arrest warrant has been issued, but already from the moment of an arrest based on an Interpol alert, an SIS alert or a European Arrest Warrant.

As a Certified Specialist in Criminal Law with a focus on extradition law, I advise and represent affected persons nationwide before the competent Higher Regional Courts and in constitutional complaint proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court.

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